Ah... bug hunting, hacking, penetration testing. Some are in it for the money, some for fun, and some are just nerds.
Some of you are already thinking "but money is fun, your logic is off" — and my reply is: you'd be better off directing that energy toward actually learning web security than winning imaginary arguments against a blog post. (Yes, I'm aware I'm currently arguing with myself in a blog post.)
Anyway. That dopamine rush when you find a bug — or even just a lead — hits like a hammer. Money heads get the high and go buy an iPhone. Fun junkies get a new reason to live. Nerds get a new reason to nerd around. It gets you hooked, I'll admit that.
But when the drought comes — a few days without a finding — and that dopamine withdrawal creeps around the corner, it hits like two hammers. Kinda like cocaine, or so I've been told.
As the song goes: "when you're high you never, ever wanna come down". So you keep digging, keep chasing that hit again and again. The longer the drought, the worse it gets. It escalates from a simple withdrawal crisis — "will I ever find another bug?" — straight to an existential one — "what is the purpose of life?"
It's a wild rollercoaster, and only the most persistent prevail. So if you're just getting into hacking and find yourself wondering what I'd say to a beginner, it's simple: welcome to the jungle.
In this and upcoming posts I'm going to write about real findings — with practical tips and tricks you can actually fold into your methodology. Not the kind of fluffy advice you read in some "research paper" drowning in fancy words that sounds impressive but you're probably never going to actually use when you're out there hacking real targets. But hey, it's a great read because Justin Gardner said so.
Let's start with something smooth and simple to get you going — like downing a few shots of tequila before a first date.
The Finding
My target had a wildcard scope (*.target.com), so most subdomains were fair game. I started with Google dorks — specifically:
site:target.com -www
This tells Google to return all indexed *.target.com subdomains while excluding www.target.com, which was just a boring landing page. One result stood out immediately: app.target.com/login.aspx.
The .aspx extension told me the server was running on IIS (Internet Information Services) — Microsoft's web server. A login page also means there's more functionality behind it, so I kept digging.
The next move was IIS Tilde Enumeration — a lesser-known technique specific to IIS servers. When misconfigured, IIS leaks partial file and directory names through HTTP responses, which makes it possible to guess or bruteforce the full filenames and directory paths. Tools like iis_tilde_enum or IIS ShortName Scanner automate this. The server was vulnerable, and I found:
- A
/web/directory - A
download.aspxfile inside it
Hitting /web/download.aspx with a GET request returned a 400 Bad Request with an error message saying the URL parameter was missing. No need to brute force — I just added ?url=https://example.com and the server fetched it and returned the response.
SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) confirmed. This vulnerability allows an attacker to make the vulnerable server send HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations — including internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and other resources that should never be reachable from the outside. At this point I had confirmed the server was fetching external URLs like https://example.com, but fetching external URLs alone isn't particularly impactful — any decent triage team would rate that as low or informational. So I pushed further.
My next move was hitting the cloud Instance Metadata Service endpoint:
?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
169.254.169.254 is the internal metadata endpoint used by major cloud providers. It's only accessible from within the server itself — not from the internet. If SSRF can reach it, you can potentially extract credentials, instance roles, and other sensitive configuration data. The server responded with the metadata listing.
I now had a critical SSRF with access to cloud metadata — already reportable. But I kept digging, wondering if there was more to squeeze out of it. Since it was a Windows/IIS server, I tried Windows-specific paths:
?url=\Windows\Logs\CBS\CBS.log
\Windows\Logs\CBS\CBS.log is specific to Windows — it's a real system log file (CBS stands for Component Based Servicing, used by Windows Update). It's a good path to test because it exists on virtually every Windows server by default, so if you can read it you've confirmed arbitrary file read. The file was accessible, exposing other paths and files on the server which I could also read, making the PoC even stronger.
So now I had Arbitrary File Read on top of the SSRF. This vulnerability allows an attacker to read the contents of files on the server's filesystem — including system files, configuration files, and potentially sensitive data like credentials or private keys.
I genuinely didn't know whether I was the luckiest person alive or actually good at this. Probably both.
I reported it, got triaged as critical, and walked away with a $5000 bounty.
Takeaways
→ site:target.com -www is a simple but effective Google dork for subdomain discovery. The - (minus) character can be used to exclude uninteresting subdomains like the main landing page, leaving only the ones worth digging into.
→ IIS Tilde Enumeration leaks partial file/directory names — always try it on IIS targets.
→ 169.254.169.254 is always worth trying when you have an SSRF — check whether you can access the cloud instance metadata service, which can expose credentials and sensitive configuration data.
→ Technology-specific payloads - Always adapt your payloads to the underlying technology. In this case the server was running Windows/IIS, so Windows-specific paths led to arbitrary file read.